July 17, 2023
The Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media has sent WeChat a detailed series of questions after it failed to appear before the committee to give evidence despite repeated requests.
WeChat and its parent company Tencent demonstrated contempt for the Parliament of Australia through its refusal to appear before the Committee last week, but has now “committed to providing responsive information to the Committee in writing”. I intend to hold them to that commitment.
The Committee has sent WeChat 53 questions asking for an explanation on its links to the Chinese Communist Party, whether it censors content critical of the Chinese government and promotes CCP propaganda, and whether the application is used to surveil and target Australian users critical of the regime.
WeChat has until Friday 21 July 2023 to provide a response.
The Committee will soon report back to the Parliament with recommendations including, if necessary, any legislative measures required to ensure the integrity and transparency of all social media platforms operating in Australia, and to protect the freedoms of Australians online.
If WeChat fails to directly answer the Committee’s questions, and believes these recommendations are unfavourable to its interests, it will have no one to blame but itself.
1. Does Tencent Holdings Limited have any Chinese Communist Party members on its board or management? Please list the names and positions of any party officials.
2. Does WeChat have any Chinese Communist Party members on its board or management?
3. How many times have WeChat or Tencent representatives appeared in-person or virtually before a parliamentary or congressional committee’s public hearing in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, European Union, and Australia? Please list the dates and locations of any appearances.
4. Your submission states that WeChat servers are all located outside of mainland China. Where exactly are WeChat’s servers located?
5. Where are Weixin’s servers located? Please specify the countries.
6. How many registered WeChat users are currently in Australia? Please specify the exact number of users.
7. How many registered Weixin users are currently in Australia? Please specify the exact number of users.
8. If a Weixin user moves to and permanently resides in Australia, does that user continue on the Weixin platform or can they move across to the WeChat platform?
9. Your submission states that Weixin is designed for users in the PRC, is operated by a PRC entity, and is governed by PRC law. Do you consider that Weixin users permanently in Australian are subject to PRC law?
10. Where is WeChat’s corporate headquarters located?
11. How many WeChat corporate offices are located outside China? Please specify which countries, if any, have WeChat offices.
12. How many employees does WeChat have?
13. Does WeChat have any employees outside China?
14. Are any WeChat employees also members of the Chinese Communist Party? Please specify the number of CCP members employed by WeChat.
15. Are any WeChat employees also holding dual roles with Chinese state media organisations, including but not limited to, Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily, and China Global Television?
16. Do Chinese Government entities or Chinese Communist Party officials monitor, moderate or censor any content on WeChat within and/or outside China?
17. Does the Chinese Government or Party officials conduct surveillance activities via the WeChat app on its own citizens?
18. On 7 May 2020, a Citizen Lab investigation reported that WeChat surveils non-China registered accounts and uses messages from those accounts to train censorship algorithms to be used against China-registered accounts. Their research showed that files and images shared by WeChat users with accounts outside of China are subject to political surveillance and this content is used to train and build up the censorship system that WeChat uses to censor China registered users.
a. Are these reports accurate?
b. If so, does this surveillance extend to chat messages, files and images sent or received by Australian users of WeChat?
c. If yes, is this data stored by WeChat servers in mainland China? Who has access to that data?
d. Do Chinese Government or Party officials use this information for the purposes of targeting the families of Chinese-Australian diaspora who are political critics of the Chinese Government?
19. Citizen Lab reported that China-registered accounts are under terms of service in the jurisdiction of China (Shenzhen) and are subject to censorship, while censorship persists for China-registered accounts even if the account is later associated with a phone number outside of China. Are these findings accurate and if so, does censorship apply to China-registered accounts that are then later associated with an Australian phone number?
20. Who is responsible for WeChat’s content moderation policy?
21. Please provide a copy of WeChat’s content moderation policy.
22. Does WeChat censor content on its app that can be described as criticism of the Chinese Government?
23. Does WeChat censor content that raises awareness of the documented human rights violations against the Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang at the hands of the Chinese Government?
24. Does WeChat censor content posted by pro-democracy Hong Kong activists?
25. Does WeChat censor content that relates to the Tiananmen Square student protests and massacre that occurred in 1989?
26. If an Australian WeChat user publicly posted material relating to Xinjiang, pro-democracy Hong Kong activists, or the Tiananmen Square incident, is it WeChat’s policy to remove those accounts from your platform?
27. What is WeChat’s policy on freedom of expression?
28. Are Australian users permitted to express their views freely on your platform, including on political matters that may be sensitive to the Chinese Communist Party?
29. Has WeChat ever cooperated with requests from China’s national intelligence services, in accordance with the National Intelligence Law of 2017 or other Chinese government authorities for information relating to Australian users of the WeChat platform?
a. If yes, please list the number of requests made in relation to Australian users, in a
detailed breakdown year-by-year, in the past 5 years.
30. Your submission states that the personal information of Australian WeChat users’ data is stored in Singapore. For the avoidance of doubt, do employees of WeChat or Tencent have access to this data?
a. If yes, on how many occasions has Australians’ data in Singapore been accessed by WeChat or Tencent?
31. Dr Seth Kaplan, a professorial lecturer at John Hopkins University who lived in China for seven years, in his testimony to this Select Committee said that “narratives are managed, information is managed and dissenting views are demoted or eliminated” and that WeChat is “basically a narrative machine for the [Chinese Communist Party]”.
a. Do you agree with Dr Kaplan’s characterisation of WeChat?
b. If you disagree, please explain why.
32. What is WeChat’s policy for the accounts of prominent elected officials outside of China, including heads of government?
a. What was the policy in 2019?
b. Has this policy changed since 2019? If so, why?
33. Has WeChat ever interfered with an Australian member of parliament’s WeChat account?
34. Has WeChat removed the accounts of any elected member of a federal, state or territory parliament in Australia? Please list any instances in which such accounts have been removed and the reasons why.
35. Has WeChat taken any adverse action, such as a suspension or warning, against the accounts of any elected member of a federal, state or territory parliament in Australia? Please list any instances in which such adverse action was taken and the reasons why.
36. Why did WeChat pull down then Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s WeChat account in January 2022, just a few months before the Australian federal election in May 2022?
a. It was reported that Mr Morrison’s WeChat account was transferred to Fuzhou 985 Information Technology Co Ltd, and it had rebranded the account as the ‘Australian
Chinese New Life’. Who in WeChat authorised this transfer?
b. Why did WeChat fail to communicate to Mr Morrison about this transfer?
c. Why did WeChat ignore the requests of Australian Government representatives seeking to restore Mr Morrison’s WeChat?
d. Has WeChat since sought to restore this account to Mr Morrison? If not, why not?
e. Was this an intervention into Australia’s domestic political affairs?
37. Your submission states that WeChat’s Acceptable Use Policy specifically and expressly prohibits inauthentic content and behaviour, including to remove false news, disinformation and misinformation where behaviours against that policy are identified.
a. What is WeChat’s process for identifying misinformation and disinformation as it relates to Australian’s electoral or political affairs?
b. What is WeChat’s working definitions of what constitutes misinformation and disinformation?
c. Does WeChat partner with reputable and independent, third-party fact checking organisations to counter misinformation and disinformation on your platform?
d. How many times has WeChat removed misinformation and disinformation relating to Australia’s electoral events, such as the 2022 federal election or during the debate in the upcoming referendum on the Voice?
38. Does WeChat actively cooperate with the Australian Electoral Commission to promote trusted information relating to Australia’s electoral processes, and to counter misinformation or disinformation that may be spread on your platform relating to Australia’s electoral processes?
39. Does WeChat support Australian-based civil society organisations to maintain an online presence on your platform to promote trusted information relating to Australia’s electoral and political processes?
40. Does WeChat cooperate with Australian government authorities in relation to foreign interference or espionage offences that may be conducted via your platform?
41. Your 2020 submission states you responded to correspondence from the Australian Government’s Attorney-General’s Department to offer to meet in person to discuss Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme. Please provide a copy of this correspondence.
42. Please specify the dates of any meetings held since that correspondence between WeChat and the Australian Government’s Attorney-General’s Departments and specify the attendees representing WeChat or Tencent.
43. The committee has heard compelling evidence of disturbing allegations of transnational repression conducted over social media in Australia which threatens the freedom of expression of Australians. Transnational expression is when governments reach across national borders to silence dissent among their diaspora and exile communities, and may take the form of online trolling, stalking or harassment and is typically conducted by authoritarian states to coerce their citizens and others abroad.
a. Does ‘transnational repression’ violate WeChat’s Acceptable Use policy or any other policy?
b. Has WeChat facilitated transnational repression your platform to target, harass and intimidate Australian activists who are critical of the Chinese Government’s human rights record?
c. ASPI has submitted to this committee that their research has found the Chinese Communist Party is targeting women of Asian descent and subjecting them to high levels of personal abuse to stifle their views and discredit their work. Can you confirm whether this has ever occurred on WeChat and if so, what has WeChat done to stop this activity?
44. Does WeChat or Tencent have an official position on the governance of The Republic of China (Taiwan)?
45. Has WeChat or Tencent ever moderated, removed, or censored any news, content, or comment by an Australian WeChat user relating to The Republic of China (Taiwan), or to The People’s Republic of China and Taiwan?
46. What is WeChat’s policy relating to acts of bullying, aggression, or intimidation by individual users in Australia?
a. State WeChat’s policy relating to user conduct, as accessible by users.
47. Has WeChat or Tencent ever moderated, removed, or censored any news, content, or comment in Australia relating to LGBT issues?
48. Has WeChat or Tencent ever moderated, removed, or censored any news, content, or comment in Australia relating to the proposed Voice to Parliament referendum in Australia?
49. Has WeChat ever been asked to moderate or correct misinformation or disinformation relating to Australia’s electoral processes posted on your platform by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)? Please specify when this has occurred during the 2022 Australian federal election.
50. How would WeChat approach and action any such request from the AEC?
51. In a meeting with Australian government officials in China on 10 May 2019 was the establishment of a WeChat account for the then Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison discussed? If so:
a. Were assurances sought that the account would not be interfered with if it was established?
b. Were those assurances given by WeChat or Tencent?
c. If so, why were those assurances broken when the Prime Minister’s account was first censored and then had its access to the account revoked when the ownership of the account was transferred in the lead up to the May 2022 federal election?
d. Doesn’t this constitute ‘textbook foreign interference’ as testified to the committee by Fergus Ryan from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute?
52. Has the Albanese Government consulted with Tencent or WeChat about its proposed Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2023?
53. Does WeChat support the Australian Government’s Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2023?
